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Article 10

GULLIVER'S TRAVELS AND
LOCKE’S RADICAL
NOMINALISM

Nicholas Hudson

Swift's interest in linguistic issues has been the subject of much
modern study, though without the conclusion that Swift had
many profound observations to make about the nature of
words or the relationship between language and the world.
The consensus has been that Swift was a naive empiricist who
detested all kinds of abstruse speculation, and who was firmly
convinced that the world was perfectly intelligible without
language. The role of words was simply to convey information
as plainly and transparently as possible. “What is true is true,”
summarised W. P. Carnocnan, "and truth lies with things, not
with words."1
In this essay, I will contend that Swift’s
linguistic ideas were more adventurous and challenging than
previously assumed. The satiric strategies of Gulliver's Travels
reflect Swift's belief that language profoundly influences our
perceptions and moral values, and governs our classification of

1 W. P. Carnochan, Lemuel Gulliver's Mirror for Man (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1968), 155. See also Fredrik N. Smith, Language and Reality in
Swift's "A Tale of a Tub" (Columbus Ohio State University Press, (1979), 9-11.
The most recent and complete study of Swift's linguistic interests is Ann Cline
Kelly, Swift and the English Language (Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1988). See also Kelly's article “Arter Eden Gulliver's (Linguistic) Travels,”
ELH 45 (1978): 33-54; Clive T. Probyn, "Swift and Linguistics: The Context
behind Lagado and Around the Fourth Voyage,” Neophilologus 58 (1974) 425-39;
Timothy J. Reiss, “Gulliver's Critique of Euclid," in The Discourse of Modernism
(Ithaca and London Cornell University Press, 1983), 328-50.
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nature into species. Our knowledge of things, he implies,
cannot fully be separated from our use of words.
This is a doctrine which not only Swift but many other
authors of the eighteenth century developed from the nominal
istic theories of John Locke. That Locke was the source of a
sceptical tradition in linguistic thought may surprise some
readers. It is still widely assumed that the influence of Locke’s
Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) was to confirm
and propagate the Royal Society’s belief that the physical world
was the sole source of truth. Words were meant only com
municate that truth clearly and unambiguously.2 Yet it was
Locke who directly inspired later philosophers such as Condil
lac and Rousseau with the belief that all knowledge depended
on words, and that there could be no reason without language.
Swift was among the authors who experimented with this
theory, though his primary aim was not to construct a
philosophical system, but to exploit the new-found power of
language to satirise human pride and "vex” his readers.
Gulliver's Travels thus rejects the beginning of a new era of
philosophy—a "linguistic turn” that occurred two centuries
before our recent interests in semiotics and deconstruction. In
the last section of this essay, I will propose that Swift’s satire
signals the beginning of a new episteme in eighteenth-century
thought, and the passing of what Foucault has called the
“Classical Age,” with its confidence in a fixed natural order and
the merely “representative” function of words. As a work that
challenged this old world-view, Gulliver's Travels is of remarkable interest not only to literary scholars, but also to students
of intellectual history and the history of linguistics. Its techniques reflect the inspirations of an author unafraid to pursue
some of the most revolutionary implications of Locke’s radical

2 A goad example of this view is W S. Howell’s discussion of Locke in
Eighteenth Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University
Press. 1971), 259-98. Locke's “whole theory," observes Howell, is that “true
understanding originates in the studv of things rather than m the manipulation of
words* (291). Locke's possible influence on Swift has been noted by several
scholars, but usually with the assumption that the Essay strengthened Swift's
conviction tn "the propriety of our senses for the concerns of life’ (Kenneth
MacLean. John Locke and English Literature tn the Eighteenth Century [New York:
Russell & Russell. 1962], 168). See also Walter J. Ong, "Swift on the Mind: Satire
in a Closed Field," in Rhetoric, Rornance, and Technology (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1971), 190-212.
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The possible importance of Locke’s discussion of “nominal
essences" as a background co Gulliver's Travels was first
described some time ago by Rosalie L. Colie and Irvin Ehrenpreis.' Those scholars, however, were not concerned with
the sceptical implications of Locke’s theories or with the
language of Swift's satire. Colie pointed out that the images of
drills and horses in Locke's Essay, and in a subsequent debate
between Locke and Edward Stillingfleet, bear an interesting
similarity to the creatures in part 4 of Gulliver's Travels. They
show, remarked Colie, that Swift shared Locke’s “optimism”
about the reality of a physical world beyond human defini
tions. On the basis of the same debate, Ehrenpreis argued that
Swift's intention was to question the definition of "man” as
animal rationale, and to lead the reader to accept a new
“mixed" definition that included the traits of both Yahoos and
Houyhnhnms. In returning to the same set of passages here,
my point will be that Locke undermines the possibility of
making any correct definitions at all. He argues that the
classification of humans, apes, horses and so forth into separate
species is made by humans alone, and does not represent the
real order of things in nature. This is not, moreover, my
fashionable re-reading of Locke in the light of twentieth
century relativism or deconstruction. It is consistent with how
Locke was read by both his critics and admirers in the eighteenth century.
In his chapter on “The Names of Substances" in book 3 of
the Essay, Locke made this important claim: “It is evident, that
we sort and name Substances by their nominal, and not by
their real Essence...As to the latter, ’tis evident they are made try
the Mind, and not by Nature: For were they Nature’s Workmanship, they could not be so various and different in several

3 Rosalie L. Colie, "Gulliver, the Locke Stillingfleet Controversy, and the Nature
of Man," History of Ideas Newsletter 2 ()95b): 58-62; Irvin Ebrenpreis, "The
Meaning of Gulliver's Last Voyage," Review of English Literature 3 (1962): 18-36.
We know that Swift had read Locke's Essay, which he discussed briefly but with
familiarity in Remarks upon a Book, intitled "The Rights of the Christian Church"
(1708). "People...are likely to improve their Understanding with Locke," he
remarked (Prose Works, ed. Herbert Davis |Oxford: Basil Blackwell, (1966), 2: 97).
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Men, as experience tells us they are."4 This statement contradicted the traditional assumption, still common among
philosophers in Locke’s time, that humans had direct acquaint
ance with the real order of species and genera as established by
God in nature. As Locke pointed out, however, it was easy to
think of examples of creatures that were so similar that it was
difficult to decide whether they belonged to the same or
different species.
His major and most challenging example was the problem
of classifying the species “man.” Travellers to distant lands
testified that “there are Creatures in the World, that have
shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want Language, and
Reason."5 Should such beings be called “men”? One’s answer
to this question, argued Locke, depended entirely on whether
one made shape or language and reason more essential to the
definition of a human. The same question arose in deciding
how to differentiate a mute and irrational “Changeling" from
an equally mute and irrational “Drill”. “Shall the difference of
Hair only on the Skin, be a mark of a different internal
specifick Constitution between a Changeling and a Drill, when
they agree in Shape, and the want of Reason, and Speech?”6
There seemed, in fact, no good reason why drills and changelings should be placed in different categories when they agreed
in everything but skin color and hairiness. Reports of stillborn babies with “the Bodies of Men” but “the Heads of
Beasts, as Dogs, Horses, etc, ” raised especially knotty problems
of classification. If these beings had survived and “could have
spoke,” theologians would have been faced with a major
quandary in deciding whether they should be baptised, or
whether killing them could be called “murder.”
Locke’s point in these illustrations was not that previous
philosophers had improperly defined “man" as "animal rationale,” or that we should contrive a "truer” definition. He wished
to prove, rather, there was no "true” definition of "man.” This
position had far-reaching consequences for the understanding of
language, nature and knowledge. Locke had introduced what
Lia Formigari calls a “radical arbitrariness” into human acts of
classifying and naming. His arguments undermined confidence

5 John Locke. An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1975), bk. 3, ch. 6, §26. 453.
Locke, bk. 3, ch. 6. §22. 450.
6 Locke, bk. 3. ch. 6. §22. 451.
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that “classifications (or predicamental series)” were “the mirror
of nature.”7 This assessment of Locke is corroborated by M.
M. Slaughter, who contends that Locke’s argument “discredits
taxonomy” and "excludes the possibility of obtaining certainty
or explanation in empirical science.”8
For traditional-minded authors who replied to Locke, his
denial that there were "unmovable Boundaries” between the
species, "made by Nature,” opened to door to Pyrrhonism and
infidelity. I will consider two of the most important replies to
Locke, those by the prominent Anglican scholar and Bishop of
Worcester, Edward Stillingfleet, and a later critique of the Essay
by Locke’s eminent philosophical contemporary, J. G. Leibniz.
Stillingfleet charged that Locke had given anti-Christian writers
a dangerous new weapon in arguing that species and genera
were “meer Names, or signs of Ideas''9 This thesis threatened
belief in a stable natural order, sorted into fixed species by the
infinite wisdom of God. Locke’s thesis was also self-evidently
wrong, for we have a direct and intuitive understanding of the
real differences between various species. We know that all
"men” are of the same species not because they "have the same
common Name,” but because we recognise that humans are
essentially different from “drills” and other similar creatures.
Who could fail to identify the essential difference between a
man and a horse, even if they happened to share the same

7 Lia Formigari, Language and Experience in 17th-Century British Philosophy
(Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 1988), 88. Formigari’s opinion
departs from the more traditional view that Locke maintained a clear distinction
between words and ideas, and that he was concerned with words largely as they
became a source of philosophical errors and misunderstanding. See Norman
Kretzmann, "Locke’s Semantic Theory,” in Herman Parret, ed.. History of
Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics (Berlin and New York: Walter
de Gruyter, 1976). 331-47; John W. Yolton. Locke and the Compass of Human
Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 196-223.
8 M. M. Slaughter, Universal Languages and Scientific Taxonomy in the Seventeenth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 193. Slaughter has
stressed that Locke’s Essay brought to an end the ambitions of seventeenth
century scholars to invent a perfect "philosophical" language that reflected the real
order of things in nature. There could be no perfect language when words
denoted only an arbitrary and human-made division of the world into species and
genera. Recent scholars have pointed out that Swift was sceptical of plans to create
a perfect language, and that he was satirising the Royal Society’s language projects
in part 3 of Gulliver's Travels. See Reiss, 328-50; Kelly, Swift and the English
Language, 73-88.
9 Edward Stillingfleet, The Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to Mr. Locke’s Letter,
concerning some Passages relating to his Essay of Human Understanding (London:
1697), 109.
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name? “My Man Peter and I can sit and chop Logick together,
about our Country Affairs, and he can Write and Read, and he
is a very sharp Fellow at a Bargain; but my Horse Peter can do
none of these things, and I never could find anything like
Reason in him.”10 Stillingfleet, who clearly had never met a
Houyhnhnm, had not the least doubt that our naming and
sorting of the species was "founded on real and distinct
Properties,” and not on some purely arbitrary convention.11
Whereas Stillingfleet was worried that Locke’s doctrines gave
ammunition to anti-Christian writers, Leibniz was concerned
that Locke had deprived philosophers of any ability to make
meaningful statements about the world. In New Essays on the
Human Understanding, which was composed between 1703 and
1705, but not published until 1765, Leibniz gave detailed
attention to Locke’s argument that the definition of "man” was
less fixed than people were apt to imagine. The essential
difference between humans and monkeys, contended Leibniz,
was certainly reason, and not shape or quantity of hair: "A
man of the forest, hairy though he is, will still be recognizable;
and what disqualifies a baboon is not its fur.”12 Shape or
hairiness was, in Leibniz’s view, only a "sign” of the more
essential intellectual qualities that truly distinguished the species
from each other. It was true that we ordinarily relied on these
outward signs. For example, “if there were rational animals
whose outer form differed slightly from ours, we should be
perplexed."13 But nature was so wisely ordered that these
perplexities were rare. In the present state of things, the word
“man” truly denominated a distinct species, clearly divided
from all others by the essential attribute of reason.
In the minds of these authors, Locke’s theories threatened
the possibility of a stable classification of nature. He had
undermined taxonomy, the organising principle or episteme, as
Foucault argued, of sciences in the “Classical Age.”14 Yet it was
clearly Locke, rather than Stillingfleet or Leibniz, whose ideas
would have the greatest impact on European thought in the

10 The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter (London: 1697),
162.
11 Answer to Mr. Locke’s Second Letter, 170.
12 Johann Gottfried Leibniz, New Essays on the Human Understanding, trans. Peter
Remnant and Jonathan Bennet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
bk. 3, ch. 6, 313.
13 Leibniz, bk. 3, ch. 6, 313.
14 See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage, 1970), 46-77.
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eighteenth century. As Lia Formigari remarks, Locke's Essay
"opens a new era in the philosophy of language."15 Later
philosophers who developed his nominalistic theories reached
the conclusion that language did not merely denote an outward
reality, but was the very basis of our understanding of the
world. As Condillac declared in his 1746 Essay on the Origin of
Human Knowledge, "The origin and progress of our ideas,
depends on the manner in which we make use of signs.”16
Influenced by Condillac, Rousseau remarked similarly in his
second Discourse (1755J that "men needed speech in order to
learn how to think."17 These statements signal the rise of a
very different way of understanding the world and language
from that which prevailed in the seventeenth century. In the
new "order of things," "classification” existed in the human
mind, rather than in nature. And language was no longer seen
to "represent" reality, as it was in the seventeenth century, but
rather to constitute the world as we know it."18
How does Swift's Gulliver's Travels fit into all of this? Few
issues have so preoccupied and divided modern scholars of
Swift as the problems of naming and definition in pan 4 of
Qulliver's Travels. It has usually been assumed, however, that
Swift's intention was to challenge the definition of humans as

15 Formigari, 88.
16 Etienne Bonnot, Abbe de Condillac,
Essay on the Origin of Human
Knowledge, trans. Thomas Nugent (London 1756; fact. rpt. Gainsville Scholars'
Facsimiles and Reprints, 1971), 358 On Condillac’s theories concerning the joint
evolution of reason and language, see Hans Aarsleff, “The Tradition of Condillac:
The Problem of the Origin of Language in the Eighteenth Century and the
Debate in the Berlin Academy before Herder," in From Locke to Saussure: Essays
on the Study af Language and Intellectual History (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1982), 146-209. Condillac openly acknowledged his debt to
Locke. He argued, however, that Locke bad seen the importance of language to
the understanding too late in his composition of the Essay to examine this issue
with the detail it deserved See Condillac, introduction, 10 This opinion was
later echoed by the English grammarian John Horne Tooke See The Diversions
of Purley (1786), 2 vols (2nd ed , London 1798), 36-7.
17 Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality
among Men. in The First and Second Discourses, together with Replies to Critics, and
Essay on the Origin of Languages, trans Victor Gourevitch (New York Perennial
Library, 1986), pt 1, 126, 154
18 I borrow the term “constitute* from Raymond Williams's excellent discussion
of eighteenth-century language theories in Marrum and Literature (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1977), 21-44.
Williams distinguished between
"instrumental" ana "constitutive" theories of language, naming Vico and Herder
as philosophers who expounded the latter theory that language played an essential
role in understanding the world. He does not discuss the influence of Locke or
Condillac on the development of this thesis
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“animal rationale," and to substitute another, better definition.
But if Swift’s strategies in the fourth voyage were inspired by
Locke’s discussion of species and genera in An Essay concerning
Human Undemanding, we should consider the possibility of an
even more sceptical purpose. Swift may well have agreed with
Locke that there was no "true" definition of human, though he
did, mischievously, lure us into over two centuries of ultimate
ly fruitless debate about what this definition should be.

O O O O O O O
That Swift was thinking of Locke’s doctrine of “radical
arbitrariness" is strongly suggested by the close similarity
between the creatures in pan 4 and the various beings used by
Locke and his philosophical adversaries to illustrate the
problems of definition. Horses, humans, drills, changelings,
hairy “men of the forest"—all these beings seem closely related
to the perplexing triad of beings, Gulliver, Houyhnhnms and
Yahoos, presented in the fourth voyage. The Yahoos perfectly
embody Locke’s instance of “Creatures in the World, that have
shapes like ours, but are hairy, and want Language and
Reason.” On this evidence of appearance, Gulliver's concludes
that he is a "Yahoo." This conclusion obviously contradicts the
traditional belief, as expounded by Stillingfleet or Leibniz, that
reason, not appearance, is the “essential" attribute of human
beings. But Gulliver’s assumption is also absurd from Locke’s
point of view, though for a different reason. Gulliver takes
appearance to be the sign of what Locke calls "internal
specifick Constitution," a “real essence" that humans share with
Yahoos. What he naively confuses are the arbitrary distinc
tions that he himself has made—mere acts of naming—with the
real order of Nature.
But does Swift seriously believe that his reader will discern
Gulliver's epistemological confusion? Every indication suggests
that Swift counted on our not knowing Locke's theories, or at
least agreeing with them, and on our automatic assumption,
much like Gulliver’s, that the boundaries between the species
were inscribed in Nature. His goal was to muddle these
distinctions, and to leave us in a permanent state of vexation
and indecision about the correctness or error of many key
words and definitions used throughout pan 4. Let us consider
another famous passage in part 4, the Houyhnhnm Master’s
condemnation of the human physique in chapter 4. This
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condemnation, we will note, turns on the highly debatable
substitution of the word “fore-feet” for "hands":

As to my fore Feet, he could not properly call them by
that Name, for he never observed me to walk upon
them; that they were too soft to bear the Ground; that
I generally went with them uncovered, neither was the
Covering 1 sometimes wore on them, of the same Shape,
or so Strong as that on my Feet behind...That I was not
able to feed my self, without lifting one of my fore Feet
to my Mouth, (pt. 4, ch. 4, 242)19
Some previous readers have recoiled from the obvious unfair
ness or this attack. In the words of William Bowman Piper, for
example, the Master’s criticism of Gulliver's “fore Feet" is “a
blatant piece of nonsense”20 It is ridiculous that Gulliver’s
hands should be criticised for not performing the same functions as feet. But is it really so easy to dismiss the Houyhnhnms' naming as wrong or absurd? We might consider now
Swift sets out deliberately to blur the distinction between “fore
Feet" and "hands" in early episodes in part 4. The Yahoos
seem to walk on all fours, but “often stood on their hind Feet"
(pt. 4, ch. 1, 223). They hold their Food between their forefeet, though they apparently leave the food on the ground (pt.
4, ch. 2, 229). There is even a hint that they, like humans and
Houyhnhnms, use their fore-limbs for gestures, though we
cannot be sure. Soon after his landing, Gulliver is approached
by a Yahoo, who "lifted up his fore Paw, whether out of
Curiosity or Mischief, I could not tell" (pt. 4, ch. 1, 224).
All these passages lead up the Master's unfavorable com
parison between human and Yahoo “fore Feet." Their evident
effect is to confuse our ability to deny this identification with
certainty. We may well feel discomforted, perplexed, by the
identification, but Swift has done his best to muddle the
differences we rely on to distinguish feet and hands. Nor is this
the only case where the reader is left in a state of perplexity
about how words should be defined. Later in pan 4, for

19 All references in the text to Gulliver's Travels are to Herbert Davis's edition
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965).
20
William Bowman Piper, “Gulliver’s Account of Houyhnhnmland as a
Philosophical Treatise,"in Fredrik N. Smith, The Genres of "Gulliver's Travels"
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990), 193.
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example, Gulliver finds that “it was with extreme Difficulty
that I could bring my Master to understand the Meaning of the
Word Opinion, or how a Point could be disputable; Decause
Region taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain;
and beyond our Knowledge we cannot do either. So that
Controversies, Wranglings, Disputes, a Positiveness in false or
dubious Propositions, are Evils unknown among the Houyhn
hnms" (pt. 4, ch. 8, 267). It might well be objected that this
statement is contradicted in the very next chapter, when the
Houyhnhnms have their "grand Debate" about what to do
with the Yahoos. Surely here the speakers on differing sides
may be said hold "opinions." Yet the word "opinion” is not
used in this chapter. And the polite and orderly debate at the
council hardly amounts to what we can confidently call
"wrangling,” "dispute,” or even "controversy" (see pt. 4, ch. 9,
271-3)
In the same chapter, we learn that the Houyhnhnms lack
any word for "evil.” Instead, they borrow the epithet "Yahoo”
to denominate "the Folly of a Servant, an Omission of a Child,
a Stone that cuts their Feet, a Continuance of foul or un
seasonable Weather, and the like” (pt. 4, ch. 9, 275). It might
be argued that the Houyhnhnms seem to be protecting their
claim to be "the Perfection of Nature" by using the term
“Yahoo" to describe their own imperfections. There is no
reason why the Houyhnhnms should lack a word for "evil,”
since faults do exist in their own world. On the other hand,
Swift seems deliberately to have chosen examples that make it
difficult to prove that the Houyhnhnms are not as perfect as
they would like to appear. The omission of a child or bad
weather hardly seem worthy of the name “evil,” or even
"imperfection.”
Here and in many other places in part 4, Swift's strategy is
to tease the reader with words that seem inaccurate, while
denying us the ability to reject threatening or disturbing words
with total confidence. This technique achieves its climax when
Gulliver rails arrogantly against human "pride.” Many readers
have felt that this denunciation is hypocritical.21 Swift was well
aware, however, that the true definition of the word "pride”
had become a major issue of controversy only shortly before

21 See, for example, Samuel Holt Monk, “The Pride of Lemuel Gulliver," Sewanee
Review 63 (1955): 48-73; Reiss, 349.
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the publication of Gulliver's Travels. This controversy followed
Mandeville's claim in the 1724 edition of The Fable of the Bees
that all human virtues were based on “pride," for all good
Christians are very “proud" of their virtues and enlightenment.
The answer made to Mandeville by incensed divines was that
a genuine satisfaction in one's own virtues or reason was not
“pride," properly defined: “Pride, as used by [Mandeville] in
this place, is an equivocal Term," answered Richard Fiddes, a
respected Anglian theologian, “If we understand by it, a natural
Consciousness of Worth in a Man, arising from a Sense of his
having acted according to the Order and Perfection of his
Nature, there is nothing criminal or irregular abut such a
Principle."22
Could not Gulliver or his admired Houyhnhnms be rescued
by the same defence? Swift's counts on our being unable to
answer this question with any certainty. He had firmly in
mind Locke's dictum that naming is based on our own,
frequently inconsistent criteria, and not on any “fixed,”
irrefragable standard. In short, the issue raised by the language
of part 4 is not that we need to achieve a “more correct”
definition of “man" or “perfection” or “pride." Our problem is
rather that no absolutely correct definition is possible at all.
O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Inspired by Locke's theories about the “sorting and naming” of
species and genera, later philosophers such as Condillac and
Rousseau developed the theory that “men needed speech in
order to learn now to think." This conclusion followed
logically from Locke's sceptical nominalism. If, as Locke
argued, humans were in charge of differentiating between the
species though their definitions of words, then those words did
more than “represent" some fixed truth of Nature. Rather, they
constituted our understanding of the world, and even enabled
us to think about Nature in rational ways.
Locke's influence led Swift to many related insights into the
“constitutive" function of language. The “reality" of Gulliver’s
fourth voyage will depend on how each reader defines words

22 Richard Fiddes, A General Treatise of Morality, form'd upon the Principles of
Natural Reason Only (London: 1724), preface, xxvi. For an account of this
debate, see Nicholas Hudson, Samuel Johnson and Eighteenth Century Thought
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 129-38.

258

1650-1830

like "debate," “evil," “pride,“ terms that have no absolute
meaning, and leave a considerable margin of interpretative
latitude. And elsewhere in Gulliver’s Travels, Swift explores
ways in which our perceptions of the world are shaped by
words, quite apart from the "facts" of the world beyond
language. These experiments with language reflect Swift’s own
and highly original contributions to the outburst of radical
linguistic ideas sparked by Locke’s Essay.
Throughout parts 1 and 2, Gulliver is faced with the task of
describing worlds that the reader has never seen. This task
seems relatively uncomplicated, since the only essential differences between these worlds and Europe is size.
Yet when
Gulliver compares small objects with large objects, he colors
our perception of the “facts," usually with the effect of
degrading those objects that our society considers most import
ant. Near the beginning of part 1, for example, Gulliver is
bound in "fourscore and eleven Chains, like those that hang to
a Lady's Watch in Europe, and almost as large" (pt. 1, ch. 1,
27—8) This sentence might be compared with the description
of “the great Oven" in the palace at Brobdingnag as "not so
wide by ten Paces as the Cupola of St. Paul’s" (pt. 2, ch. 4,
114). The irony of each statement derives in pan from the
humorous mixture of European and native scales of proportion
in Gulliver's language: the phrase "almost as large" seems
ridiculous when it refers to a lady’s watch-chain, and "not so
wide" seems similarly inappropriate when combined with St.
Paul's Cathedral. Furthermore, the equation of manacles with
ladies watch-chains, or St. Paul's with an oven, conforms with
a general pattern of imagery throughout the first two voyages.
Elsewhere in part 1, the “ancient Temple" where Gulliver is
lodged is called his "House" (pt. 1, ch. 2 , 29). The emperor
and his entourage appear to Gulliver like a “Petticoat" (pt. 1,
ch. 2, 31). The ceremonial sashes awarded in court are de
scribed as "Threads" (pt. 1, ch. 3, 37). When Gulliver's posses
sions are searched by the Lilliputians, his comb is compared
with “the Pallisado's before your Majesty’s Court” (pt. 1, ch.
2, 32). This pattern is continued in part 2, though the terms
of comparison are reversed The farmer who finds Gulliver is
described as “Tall as an ordinary Spire-steeple" (pt. 2, ch. 1,
86). A coach is compared to a “a Square of Westminster-Hall"
(pt. 2, ch. 4, 112).
On one side of these comparisons are a watch-chain, oven,
petticoat, comb, thread and house—domestic and predominant-

Locke's Radical Nominalism

259

ly “feminine” objects; on the other side are chains, St. Paul’s,
an ancient temple, pallisados, a steeple, and Westminster
Hall—symbols of power, sanctity and masculinity. Bringing
these words into juxtaposition inevitably tends to diminish the
prestige of the symbols of power. The ironies of parts 1 and
2 are, indeed, based very largely on the emotive value that we
attach to words. Absurdly, Gulliver seems entirely unconscious of these differing emotive values. He intends all these
comparisons only to "clarify” the worlds he describes, to give
the reader a better picture. But the reader finds, if only halfconsciously, that Gulliver’s comparisons constantly transform
his or her perception of these worlds. Beyond the mere
denoting of things” in Lilliput and Brobdingang, words are
controlling our "moral” impressions of dignity or insignificance.
Most striking is the implication that these feelings of
prestige or pettiness are based on nothing intrinsic to objects
themselves. The objects that we consider important are big,
and unimportant objects are small. Moreover, if Gulliver is
right in suspecting that there are creatures even bigger than the
Brobdingnagians and smaller than the Lilliputians, then there
is theoretically no end to the shifts of value that we experience
throughout the first two voyages.23 All our values or honor,
power, and even sexual difference belong to an infinite chain
of relativity.
But surely there are some qualities that are
intrinsic, and cannot be manipulated merely by a “translation”
of vocabulary to suit the reader’s scale of physical proportion.
These qualities might include reason and virtue, for presumably
nothing is less reasonable or virtuous simply by being large or
small. Yet the “translation” that occurs in the fourth voyage to
the Land of the Houyhnhnms undermines human claims to
either reason or virtue. And here again, we discover that our
language in many ways determines our perspective of the
world.
The narrative situation of part 4 is fundamentally different
from the narrative situation in the previous voyages. Previously, Gulliver was describing an alien world to his European
reader (the one major exception being his description of
Europe for the King of Brobdingnag). Part 4, on the other
hand, is dominated by Gulliver’s description of our world for

23

See

pt. 2, ch. 1., 87.

260

1650-1850

the benefit of the Houyhnhnm Master. Furthermore, Gulliver
does not have the advantage he relied on in previous parts of
comparing all objects in one world with similar objects in
another. As he explains, "I doubted much, whether it would be
possible for me to explain my self on several Subjects whereof
is Honour could have no Conception, because I saw nothing
in his Country to which I could resemble them" (pt 4, ch. 4,
243). The paucity of "Similitudes" has a profoundly important
effect on the narrative, because Gulliver must rebuild our
world from the bottom up, defining even the most ordinary
words in detail.
Indeed, the whole discourse to the Master emerges from
Gulliver's attempts to explain one ordinary statement. When
asked where he came from, Gulliver answers, “I came over the
Sea, from a far Place, with many others of my Kind, in a great
hollow Vessel made of the Bodies of Trees; That, my Companions forced me to land on this Coast, and then left me to
shift for myself" (pt. 4, ch. 3, 235). The Master accuses Gulliver
of saying "the thing which was not,” revealing, as Timothy J
Reiss has pointed out, the Houyhnhnms' debilitating habit of
dismissing as untrue everything that has not fallen into their
experience.24 Even from the reader's perspective, however,
Gulliver has misrepresented his journey in a subtle and
complex way, despite his efforts to be strictly factual.
We might compare Gulliver’s way of describing his ship ("a
great hollow Vessel made of the Bodies of Trees") with the
phrase used at the beginning of part 4 for the benefit of the
European reader—“a stout Merchant-man of 350 Tuns” (pt. 4,
ch. 1, 221). For the reader, this phrase contained a great deal
of information beyond the narrowly factual description given
later to the Houyhnhnm Master; it denoted the ship’s size
measured implicitly against other ships in the modern fleet, the
function of the snip in European trade, and the extent of
Gulliver's new responsibilities as a ship's captain. All this
information is left out of Gulliver’s statement to the Master,
creating a curiously childish picture of “Companions" building
a hollow vessel, riding about on the sea and abandoning one of
their fellows for no reason. Later, Gulliver tries twice more to
make the Master understand his statement. And each lime, we
note a significant adjustment of his language as the Master

24 See Reiss, 342.
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gradually becomes more knowledgeable of European society
and its ways. "A great hollow Vessel made of the Bodies of
Trees" becomes "a great hollow Vessel made of Wood" (pt. 4,
ch. 3, 238), and finally "Ship" (238). The purpose of this ship
is clarified when Gulliver’s says that “I left to get Rjches" (pt.
4, ch. 4, 243). "Companions" becomes “Fellows of desperate
Fortunes, forced to by from the Places of their Birth, on
Account of their Poverty or their Crimes" (pt. 4, ch. 4, 243-4).
Where Gulliver’s descriptions become shorter, as with "Ship,”
the Master has become accustomed to the linguistic "shorthand" which we use to denominate the material, construction,
purpose and so forth of familiar objects. Where Gulliver’s
description become longer, he is attempting to explain all the
circumstances of our world—its economic conditions, laws,
social hierarchy—needed to complete the Master's understand
ing of how Gulliver arrived on the island.
In short, to make his Houyhnhnm interlocutor comprehend
even the most straightforward statement, Gulliver must set his
journey in the context of the entire society of Europe.
Through a quite natural progression, the description of his
journey transforms into a commentary on “Power, Government, War, Law, Punishment, and a Thousand other Things
[which] had no Terms, wherein that Language could express
them" (pt. 4, ch. 4, 244). As in parts 1 and 2, therefore, we
discover that words do far more than signify basic “facts."
Every word possesses "additional” meanings beyond its bare
denotative value.
In the first and second voyages, those
meanings are the feelings of honour and power, or of common
ness and domesticity, that speakers attach to different words.
In the last voyage, Gulliver finds that no word can be truly
understood apart from the whole social perceptive that im
plicitly governs its interpretation in common speech.
According to Kathleen M. Swain, in an excellent and
neglected study, the effect of Gulliver's descriptions in part 4
is the "definition, the apprehension and clarification of all."25
Forced to define exactly what a “war, a “soldier," or a “lawyer”
really is, Gulliver uncovers unpleasant facts about our society
that we prefer not to think about. Nevertheless, we have
considered that many of the key terms in part 4—Yahoo,

25 Kathleen M Swain, A Reading of Gulliver's Travels (The Hagar and Paris.
Mouton, 1972), 190
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Houyhnhnm, fore feet, opinion, evil, pride—are not fully
defined, and even lack anything more than a “nominal”
significance. The reader is left feeling that these words have
been used unfairly by Gulliver and the Master, but is unable to
establish a clear alternative meaning. In the case of these and
many important terms, there is no fixed or “essential" meaning
that can be uncovered
Indeed, it may be questioned whether any of Gulliver’s
"clarifications" of our world do not, on close inspection,
contain an important element of distortion.
First, because
Gulliver lacks proper "similtitudes," all human activities and
traits are approximated to what is only roughly similar, with
little attention being given to differences.
The Master’s
confidence that humans are “Yahoos," for example, derives in
part from his habit of limiting himself for practical reasons to
comparison rather than contrast. Because “he meant only to
observe what Parity there was in our Matures," all those traits
which differentiate humans from Yahoos, such as “Learning,
Government, Arts, Manufactures and the like," are dismissed
as irrelevant (pt. 4, ch 7, 262).
Second, many words and distinctions in the Houyhnhnm
world do refer to the “real essence" of things, while all human
distinctions are "nominal.”
The social hierarchy of the
Houyhnhnms, for example, is based on a system of visual
marks that reliably denote the inward nature of the different
ranks. The Master points out to Gulliver that “among the
Houyhnhnms, the White, the Sorrel, and the Iron grey, were not
so exactly shaped as the Bay, Dapple-grey, and the Black-, nor
born with equal Talents ot Mind” (pt. 4, ch. 6, 256). Partly
because Gulliver lacks accurate “Similitudes," relying constantly
on the Master’s "Assistance when I wanted proper Words” (pt.
4, ch. 4, 243), he imports this system of “real essences" into his
description of Europe. He indicates that the European social
hierarchy is based on a similar system of visual marks for
inward nature: "a weak diseased Body, a meager Countenance,
and a sallow Complexion, are," he claims, “the true Marks of
noble Blood" (pt. 4, ch. 6, 257). Similarly, ministers of state are
described as a "Species of Yahoo" (pt. 4, ch. 6, 255), rather than
a position in the political hierarchy. Because Gulliver is trying
to make the European world understandable to a Houyhnhnm,
who regards appearance as indicative of inward nature, he
portrays human society as a perverted natural order rather than
a corrupt political system.
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Again, our former question arises: is the reader meant to
recognise that Gulliver’s descriptions are misrepresenting
European society in such subtle ways? That many readers
have concluded that Gulliver’s description "clarifies" the reality
of our world is hardly surprising, since Gulliver himself is so
unconscious of the distorting quality of his language. Throughout the Travels, Gulliver is remarkable for his linguistic
naivety, his reliance on language as a transparent medium for
"facts," and his failure to recognise that language is a deeply
colored mirror that transforms our perceptions of truth. On
the other hand, no careful reader can avoid feeling deeply
“vexed," to use Swift’s term. There is something wrong about
Gulliver's narrative, even if most readers may be unable to
identify or formulate the exact nature of the linguistic distortions that they sense on an intuitive level.
o

O

0

0 O

0

0

The linguistic ideas that we have examined in Gulliver's Travels
reflect what might well be described as a new episteme in
Western thought. In Swift’s time and in later decades, the
organising principles of what Foucault called the “Classical
Age"—taxonomy, mathesis, and the “representative" function
of the linguistic sign—yielded to scepticism about the reality of
species and genera, and the internalisation of the sign as the
very fabric of rational thought. In this concluding section, 1
would like to present Gulliver's Travels as an artistic expression
of this new intellectual era. Indeed, this work might even be
viewed as the era’s most typical expression of its underlying
philosophical assumptions, occupying the same role that Las
Meninas of Velazquez or Don Quixote filled in the previous era.
Those works, as Foucault argued, dramatised the very act
of representation, the separation of the sign from the world,
and the end of the Renaissance belief in “resemblance" as the
organising principle of language and knowledge. They show
how, in the Classical Age, “language has withdrawn from the
midst of beings themselves and has entered a period of transparency and neutrality."26 Analogously, I propose, Gulliver's
Travels marks the end of the age of “representation" and the reentrance of language into the “midst or things." We are unable

26 Foucault, 56.
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to differentiate throughout this satire between language and the
reality that it is supposed to denote. This loss of the clear
distinction between sign and reality is dramatised in the work’s
numerous images of theatre, mimicry and mirrors. A close of
examination of these images reveals the same blurring of the
difference between the real and the artificial, the original and
the copy, that we have found in Swift's use of language.
Soon after his arrival in Lilliput, Gulliver remarks that the
capital looks to him "like the painted Scene of a City in a
Theatre" (pt. 1, ch. 2, 29). Because of its tininess, Lilliput does
not seem real, but like an imitation of a real world. Indeed,
this impression seems to have some foundation in the nature
of this kingdom. Lilliput is filled with absurd theatrics—with
marches, ceremonies, mock battles, and all sons of artificial
grandeur. The reader will recognise many of the displays, such
as the palace tight-rope walking and "leaping and creeping" (pt.
1, ch. 3, 39), as parodies of the European coun, with its
ministerial rivalry and cringing. Lilliput is significant largely
for what its symbolises about the pettiness and vanity of our
world. In every respect, it is a world of imitation.
Brobdingnag, on the other hand, seems to "imitate" nothing
at all. In this land, we are impressed not with any "symbolic”
representation of European manners, but instead with the
giants' often repulsive and dangerous physical reality. Here it
is Gulliver who becomes an imitation man. When he is first
taken to the farmer's house, he must enlarge all his gestures
to be understood: he makes a low bow when he is given food,
and waves his hat and makes "three Huzza’s” to show he is
unhurt after he falls over a crust (pt. 2, ch. 1, 90). He must
constantly parody human behavior, a practice that the farmer
later exploits by making Gulliver into a travelling theatrical
show. The farmer’s daughter calls him "Grildrig” or "Mannikin" (pt. 2, ch. 2, 95), and treats him like a doll. The King of
Brobdingnag, who at first thinks that Gulliver is piece of clockwork, regards Gulliver almost exactly as we previous viewed
the Lilliputians—as an imitation or “mimicry" of the real
world, important largely for what he symbolises: "he observed, how contemptible a Thing was human Grandeur,
which could be mimicked by such diminutive Insects as I" (pt.
2, ch. 3, 107).
In the episodes that we have just considered, Swift perplexes
the difference between imitation and reality. Lilliput not only
“seems" unreal because it is small: it is inherently theatrical,
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artificial and symbolic. The pageantry and protocol that makes
up the “reality" of this world is, moreover, only a slightly
exaggerated version of the European world, which is similarly
theatrical and artificial. Lilliput is an imitation of a world that
is itself imitative.
Similarly, the King of Brobdingnag’s
suggestion that Europe simply “mimics" real grandeur is
reaffirmed by Gulliver’s subsequent reference to “a Company
of English Lords and Ladies in their finery and Birth day
Cloaths, acting [my italics] their several Parts in the most
Courtly Manner of Strutting, and Bowing and Prating” (pt. 2,
ch. 3, 107). The “reality” of English court-life, Gulliver now
sees, is theatrical.
The problem of differentiating between the copy and
original becomes even more threatening in part 4, for here it
contributes to the reader’s perplexity about how “man” should
be defined. The Houyhnhnm Master assumes that Gulliver is
not a member of an unknown species, but a Yahoo “taught to
imitate a rational Creature” (pt. 4, ch. 3, 235, my italics). And
following Gulliver’s description of European wars, the Master
concludes that we differ from the Yahoos not in our possession
of “Reason," but by having “some Quality fitted to increase
our natural Vices; as the Reflection from a troubled Stream
returns the Image of an ill-shapen Body, not only larger, but
more distorted" (pt. 4, ch. 5, 248). The Houyhnhnm Master
suggests that reason is a kind of internal mirror that reflects the
body and all the brutal passions that we share with the
Yahoos. Reason is not a distinct attribute; rather it is only a
distorted copy of the lower faculties. This claim marks the
culminating challenge not only to our attempts to establish the
difference between numans and Yahoos, but also to differ
entiate between reality and images of reality, originals and
copies.
It was this difference that was being challenged by the
linguistic theories of Locke and his later admirers. In the new
philosophical outlook that Locke inspired, signs did not merely
“mirror” an external reality. They constituted that reality. This
closing of the gap between sign and signified, language and the
world, characterises some of the most interesting philosophy of
the eighteenth century. It also inspired new experiments in an
and literature, not the least of which of Gulliver's Travels.
Gulliver's Travels could only have been written in the age that
followed Locke. Moreover, the linguistic experiments of this
work demonstrate why Swift cannot be viewed merely as a
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narrow empiricist, who hated “anything of the son demanding
close thinking."27 Gulliver's Travels reveals the mind of an agile
and original thinker, responding with sophistication to some of
the most interesting and revolutionary theories of his day.

